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498 HAGAN V. SUPERIOR COURT [53 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 25538. In Bank. Jan. 26, 1960.] 
EVERT L. HAGAN et aI., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR 
COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; 
JOSEPH W. FAIRFIELD et aI., Real Parties ill In-
terest. 
[1] Prohibition":"':"Adequacyof Other Remedies: Want or Excess of 
Jurisdiction.-A writ of prohibition is an appropriate remedy 
to arrest the proceedings of a court when there is not a plain, 
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, 
and when the proceedings of the court are without or in ex-
cess of its jurisdiction. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1102, 1103.) 
[2] Id.-E1fect and Adequacy of Other Remedies-Appeal.-Share-
holders in a corporation seeking a writ of prohibition to re-
strain the superior court from entering judgment in involun-
tary dissolution proceedings in which they intervened and 
from enforcing its order requiring them to post security could 
request, and if necessary compel, the court to enter a judg-
ment dismissing their complaint in intervention for failure 
to comply with its security order (Corp. Code, § 834, subd. 
(b) ), and an appeal could then be taken from such dismissal 
challenging the propriety of the security order, but where 
such an appeal would raise a question that had already been 
presented and considered in the prohibition proceeding, no 
purpose but delay, to the prejudice of the parties and the 
courts, would be served by refusing to decide in the prohibi-
tion proceeding whether the threatened enforcement of the 
security order would be in excess of the court's jurisdiction. 
[3] ld.-Want or Excess of Jurisdiction.-Speaking generally, any 
acts which exceed the defined power of a court in any instance, 
whether that power be defined by constitutional provision, 
express statutory declaration, or rules developed by the courts 
and fonowed under the doctrine of Btare decisis, are in excess 
of jurisdiction insofar as that term is used to indicate that 
those acts may be restrained by prohibition or annulled on 
certiorari. 
[4] ld.-Want or Excess of Jurisdiction.-A court acts in excess 
of its jurisdiction if it awards costs not provided by statute, 
or if it entertains an action without requiring the posting of 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Prohibition, §§ 4, 11 et seq.; Am.Jur., Pro-
hibition, §§ 8, 20, 24. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Prohibition, §§ 11, 16(1); [2] Pro-
hibition, § 14(1); [3, 4] Prohibition, § 16(1); [5] Corporations, 
§353; [6] Corporations, §357; [7,9,10] Corporations, §860.5; 
[8) Corporations, § 852. 
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security for costs when such security is prescribed by statute. 
Conversely, it exceeds its jurisdiction if it dismisses for 
failure to comply with a statutory security provision a cause 
of action to which the provision does not apply. 
[5] Corporations-Stockholders-Suing or Defending on Behalf of 
Corporation.-Corp. Code, § 834, prescribing the conditions 
precedent to maintenance of a stockholder's derivative action, 
applies only to actions by shareholders in the right of a cor-
poration. It does not authorize the requiring of security from 
shareholders who seek to vindicate their personal rights, 
though they allege facts that would also give rise to a cor-
porate cause of action. 
[6] ld.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Inter-
vention.-Where shareholders of a corporation intervene in 
involuntary dissolution proceedings instituted by certain 
directors of the corporation, that part of their complaint in 
intervention requesting an order compelling the directors (de-
fendants in intervention) to register their shares on the cor-
poration's books and to issue new certificates evidencing such 
shares asserted rights that were indisputably personal to the 
shareholders and appropriately raised in the involuntary dis-
solution proceedings to ensure recognition of the shareholders' 
claims during the impending distribution of corporate assets. 
It was therefore in excess of the jurisdiction of the trial court 
to condition the vindication of those rights on a posting of 
security under Corp. Code, § 834. 
[7] ld.-Dissolution-Winding Up Mairs-Intervention. - Corp. 
Code, § 4653, giving to "any shareholder or creditor" an un-
qualified right to intervene in proceedings for the involuntary 
winding up or dissolution of a corporation, does not make 
that right subject to Corp. Code, § 834, relating to a stock-
holder's derivative action. 
[8] ld.-Dissolution-Winding Up Mairs.-There is no need for 
the special protection of Corp. Code, § 834, relating to a stock-
holder's derivative action, in involuntary dissolution proceed-
ings, since the court has broad powers of supervision and can 
make such orders as "justice and equity require." (Corp. 
Code, §§ 4654,4657.) 
[9] ld.-Dissolution - Winding Up Mairs - Intervention.-The 
necessity for an unqualified right of shareholders and creditors 
to intervene in proceedings for the involuntary winding up 
or dissolution of a corporation is demonstrated by the nature 
of the grounds for involuntary dissolution set forth in Corp. 
Code, § 4651, which almost without exception describe situa-
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Corporations, § 216 et seq.; Am.Jur., Cor-
porations, § 461 et seq. 
) 
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tions in which the interests of individual shareholders or 
creditors are not likely to be protected effectively by the 
corporation's directors. 
[10] Id.-DisBolution - Winding Up Affairs - Intervention.-An 
intervener in proceedings for the involuntary winding up or 
dissolution of a corporation, whether he be shareholder or 
creditor, may seek any relief that the court has jurisdiction 
to grant in sU!lh proceedings that affects or protects his under-
lying interest in the corporation or its assets. He may request 
the court to preserve corporate assets during the pendency of 
the proceedings by enjoining expenditures and requiring a 
bond pendente lite in the amount of such assets, he may bring 
to the court's attention the existence of corporate assets in the 
form of claims against the corporation's attorney or its 
directors and is entitled to use reasonable discovery procedures 
to these ends, and, on further investigation, the court might 
order the directors to press the claims or might appoint a 
receiver to do so. (Corp. Code, § 4656.) 
PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior 
Court of Los Angeles County from entering judgment in 
involuntary dissolution proceedings and to desist from en-
forcing its order requiring petitioners to post security. Writ 
granted. 
Evert L. Hagan and Charles M. Farrington, in pro. per., 
for Petitioners. 
No appearance for Respondent. 
Joseph W. Fairfield and Ethelyn F. Black for Real Parties 
in Interest. 
TRAYNOR, J.-In September 1957 four of the five direc-
tors of Benedict Heights, Inc., a California corporation, filed 
in respondent superior court a complaint for involuntary dis-
solution and winding up of the corporation. The corporation 
did not answer and its default was entered in December 1957. 
Petitioners learned of these proceedings in March 1959 and 
obtained permission of the court to intervene. They filed a 
complaint in intervention, naming as defendants in interven-
tion the four plaintiff directors and their attorney, Joseph 
Fairfield, who is allegedly in control of the corporation, its 
books and assets. The complaint in intervention included 
allegations that petitioners are shareholders in Benedict 
Heights, Inc., that defendants in intervention refusi.' to 1'('('<)6-
) 
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ni7.e them as such, that Fairfield has made uuauthorized 
expenditures of corporate funds and threatens to continue to 
do so, and that Fairfield and perhaps two of the plaintiff 
(lirertors, Rosner and Benjamin, are indebted to the corpora-
tion for wrongful diversion of its assets and for rlereliction of 
duty. The" relief sought included: (1) an order compelling 
defendants in intervention to register petitioners' shares Oil 
the corporation's books and to issue new certificates evidencing 
f;uch shares, (2) a preliminary injunction restraining Fair-
field from paying out any of the corporation's assets until 
trial of the involuntary dissolution action, (3) an order setting 
aside the default of Benedict Heights, Inc., and permitting 
petitioners to answer in behalf of the corporation, and (4) an 
order requiring Fairfield to post a bond pendente lite in an 
amount equal to the value of the corporation's assets. 
Defendants in intervention filed no answer but filed a mo-
tion under section 834 of the Corporations Code for an order 
requiring petitioners to post security for costs. Respondent 
court granted the motion and ordered petitioners to post 
$3,500 as security within 30 days after service of the order. 
The order was served on May 13, 1959, but petitioners have 
not posted any security. They allege that respondent court 
has threatened to find them in contempt if they take any 
further action in connection with the involuntary dissolution 
proceedings. 
Petitioners seek a writ of prohibition ordering respondent 
court to desist from entering judgment in the involuntary dis-
solution proceedings and to desist from enforcing its order 
requiring petitioners to post security. Fairfield, Rosner, and 
Benjamin, as real parties in interest, oppose issuance of the 
writ. 
[1] A writ of prohibition is an appropriate remedy to 
arrest the proceedings of a court when there is not a plain, 
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the 
law and when the proceedings of the court are without or in 
excess of its jurisdiction. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1102, 1103.) 
[2] Real parties in interest contend that the remedy by 
appeal is adequate. Petitioners could request, and if neces-
sary compel, respondent court to enter a judgment dismissing 
their complaint in intervention for failure to comply with its 
security order. (See Corp. Code, § 834, subd. (b); Berri v. 
Superior Court, 43 Ca1.2d 856, 860-861 [279 P.2d 8].) An 
appeal could then be taken from such dismissal challenging 
the propriety of the security order. Such an appeal, however, 
502 HAGAN t.'. SUPERIOR COURT [53 C.2d 
would raise a question that has already been fully presented 
and considered at length in this proceeding, and no purpose 
but delay, to the prejudice of the parties and the courts, would 
be served by refusing to decide the jurisdictional question at 
this time. (Atkinson v. Supe1"ior Court, 49 Ca1.2d 338, 342 
[316 P.2d 960] ; Bowles v. Superior Coud, 44 Ca1.2d 574, 582 
[283 P.2d 704] ; see also City c.f; County of San Ft'ancisco v. 
Superior Court, ante, pp. 236, 243 [347 P.2d 294]; City of 
Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 51 Ca1.2d 423, 429 [333 P. 
2d 745].)1 
Petitioners contend that the order requiring security and its 
threatened enforcement are in excess of respondent court's 
jurisdiction because the security provisions of section 834 do 
not apply to their complaint in intervention. [3] "Speak-
ing generally, any acts which exceed the defined power of a 
court in any instance, whether that power be defined by con-
stitutional provision, express statutory declaration, or rules 
developed by the courts and followed under the doctrine of 
stare decisis, are in excess of jurisdiction, insofar as that term 
is used to indicate that those acts may be restrained by prohibi-
tion or annulled on certiorari." (Abelleira v. District Court 
of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280, 291 [109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715] ; 
see Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. McConnell, 44 Cal.2d 715, 
725 [285 P.2d 636]; Tidewater Assoc. Oil Co. v. Superior 
Court, 43 Ca1.2d 815, 821 [279 P.2d 35] ; Fortenbllry v. Su-
perior Court, 16 Cal.2d 405, 407-408 [106 P.2d 411] ; Spreckels 
Sugar Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 186 Cal. 256, 260 [199 P. 
8].) [4] A court acts in excess of its jurisdiction in this 
sense if it awards costs not provided by statute (Abelleira v. 
District Court of Appeal, 17 Ca1.2d 280, 289 [109 P.2d 942, 
132 A.L.R. 715] ; see Michel v. Williams, 13 Cal.App.2d 198 
[56 P.2d 546]) or if it entertains an action without requiring 
the posting of security for costs when such security is pre-
scribed by statute (KennaZey v. S11perior Court, 43 Ca1.2d 512, 
514-515 [275 P.2d 1] ; Shell Oil Co. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 
App.2d 348, 352-355 [37 P.2d lO78] ; see Abelleira v. District 
Court of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280, 288-289 [109 P.2d 942, 132 
A.L.R. 715]). Conversely, it exceeds its jurisdiction if it 
dismisses for failure to comply with a statutory security pro-
lIn these eases an alternative writ rather than an order to show cause 
had issued. An order to 8how eause, however, like an alternative writ, 
entails an expenditure of time and effort of court and counsel tllat would 
be wasted if another remedy were subsequently found adequate and the 
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vision a cause of action properly before it to which the 
provision does not apply. 
[ I) ] Section 834 applies only to actions by shareholders 
in the right of a corporation. It does not authorize the requir-
ing of security from shareholders who seek to vindicate their 
personal rights, even though they allege facts that would also 
give rise to a corporate cause of action. (Sutter v. General 
Petroleum Oorp., 28 Cal.2d 525, 530 [170 P.2d 898, 167 A.L.R. 
271] ; Oampbell v. Olark, 159 Cal.App.2d 439, 443 [324 P.2d 
55] ; Dumm v. Pacific Valves, 146 Cal.App.2d 792, 798 [304 
P.2d 738].) 
[6] In their complaint in intervention petitioners allege 
that they are shareholders in Benedict Heights, Inc., and that 
by refusing to recognize them as such defendants in interven-
tion have prevented them from participating in the affairs of 
the corporation. They request an order compelling defendants 
in intervention to register their shares on the corporation's 
books and to issue new certificates evidencing such shares. 
This part of the complaint in intervention asserts rights that 
are indisputably personal to petitioners and appropriately 
raised in the involuntary dissolution proceedings to ensure 
recognition of petitioners' claims during the impending dis-
tribution of corporate assets. It is therefore in excess of the 
jurisdiction of respondent court to coridition the vindication 
of these rights upon a posting of security under the provisions 
of section 834. Even if other parts of the complaint in inter-
vention set forth derivative causes of action, they would not 
give respondent court jurisdictionio require security under 
section 834 with regard to independent personal causes of 
action, to which that section does not apply. 
Moreover, other parts of the complaint in intervention set 
forth matters that petitioners were also entitled to pursue 
without posting security. [7] Section 4653 of the Corpora-
tions Code gives to "any shareholder or creditor" an unquali-
fied right to intervene in proceedings for the involuntary 
winding up or dissolution of a corporation. It does not make 
that right subject to section 834, which in no event can apply 
to creditors. It cannot reasonably be assumed that the Legis-
lature restricted the rights of shareholders but not those of 
creditors, for the right of intervention is given equally to 
both. [8] Moreover, there is no need for the special protec-
tion of section 834 in involuntary dissolution proceedings 
since the court has broad powers of supervision and can 
make such orders as "justice and equity require." (Corp, 
) 
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Code, § § 4654, 4657.) [9] The necessity for an unqualified 
right to intervene in such proceedings is demonstrated by the 
very nature of the grounds for involuntary dissolution set 
forth in section 4651 of the Corporations Code.2 Almost with-
out exception these grounds describe situations in which the 
interests of individual shareholders or creditors are not likely 
to be protected e1iectively by the corporation's directors. 
[10] Accordingly an intervenor, whether he be share-
holder or creditor, may seek any relief that the court has 
jurisdiction to graut in such proceedings that a1iects or pro-
tects his underlying interest in the corporation or its assets. 
He may, therefore, request the court to preserve corporate 
assets during the pendency of the proceedings by enjoining 
expenditures and requiring a bond pendente lite in the amount 
of such assets. He may also bring to the court's attention the 
existence of corporate assets in the form of claims against the 
corporation's attorney or its directors and is entitled to use 
reasonable discovery procedures to these ends. Upon further 
investigation the court might order the directors to press the 
claims or might appoint a receiver to do so. (See Corp. Code, 
§ 4656.) 
Let a peremptory writ of prohibition issue to restrain 
respondent court from enforcing its order requiring peti-
tioners to post security and to restrain respondent court from 
entering judgment in the involuntary dissolution proceed-
ings until petitioners have been accorded an opportunity to 
I" The court, upon :filing of a verified complaint may entertain pro· 
ceedings for the involuntary winding up or dissolution of such a corpora· 
tion, when it is shown that anyone or more of the following reasons 
exist: 
(a) The corporation has abandoned its business for more than one year. 
(b) The corporation has an even numher of directors who are equally 
divided and cannot agree as to the management of its affairs, 80 that its 
business cannot longer be conducted to advantage or 80 that there is 
danger that its property and business will be impaired and lost. 
(c) The holders of the voting shares of the corporation are so divided 
into factions that they cannot agree upon or elect a board of directors 
consisting of an uneven number. 
(d) There is internal dissension and two or more factions of share· 
holders in the corporation are so deadlocked that its business cannot 
longer be conducted with ad\'antage to its shareholders. 
(e) The directors or those in control of the corporation have been 
guilty of persistent fraud, mismanagement, or abuse of authority, or 
persistent unfairness toward minority shareholders, or its property is 
being misapplied, wasted, or lost by its directors or officers. 
(f) The liquidation is reasonably necessary for the protection of the 
rights or interests of any substantial number of the shareholders or ot 
the complaining shareholders. ' 
(g) The period for which the corporation was formed haa terminated 
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establish their status as shareholders in Benedict Heights, 
Inc., and to exercise their rights as intervenors. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., and Peek, J. pro tem.,· concurred. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-The majority direct issuance 
of the peremptory writ of prohibition "to restrain respondent 
court from enforcing its order requiring petitioners to post 
security" under the provisions of section 834 of the Corpora-
tions Code, which deals with stockholders' derivative actions, 
and to further restrain that court from entering judgment in 
an involuntary dissolution proceeding until petitioners have 
been accorded an opportunity to establish their status as share-
holders in the subject corporation and to exercise certain 
claimed rights as intervenors. In my view petitioners have 
not shown that respondent court exceeded or is about to exceed 
its jurisdiction; neither have they shown that if the trial court 
erred in the exercise of jurisdiction, they do not have an 
adequate remedy by appeal. Accordingly, the order to show 
cause heretofore issued should be discharged and the writ 
should be denied. 
In the petition for prohibition petitioners allege that in 
September, :J,957, an action for involuntary dissolution of 
Benedict Heights, Inc., a California corporation, was filed in 
respondent superior court by Fairfield, Rosner and Benjamin 
(the real parties in interest in this prohibition proceeding). 
Petitioners learned of such action in March, 1959, and with 
permission of court filed therein a complaint in intervention, 
alleging, among other things, that petitioners are stockholders 
of the corporation j that they "bring this intervention pro-
ceeding in behalf of themselves and on behalf of all other 
shareholders of Benedict Heights, Inc., who desire to join in 
said proceedings"; that Fairfield is in dominion and control 
of the corporation and of its records and assets and has re-
fused to cause petitioners' shares of sUlck to be registered on 
the corporate books j that" Fairfield has, while acting as agent 
. . . of said Corporation, collected monies due to the Corpora-
tion, and made disbursements without any authorization from 
the Board of Directors and threatens to continue to do so: 
that . . . Fairfield negotiated the sale of . . . real estate . . . 
formerly owned by said Corporation: that this realty at the 
time of sale constituted the sole asset, other than stock sub-
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scriptions, of said corporation; that said parcel was sold for 
the sum of $10,000.00 ... That there has been no accounting 
to the stockholders or the last Board of Directors of the Cor-
poration for any transactions . . . Fairfield has carried out, 
since . . . 1952 . . .; [that] the assets of said Corporation 
are in danger of being lost or dissipated."l Relief sought by 
petitioners through their complaint in intervention included 
the following demands: (1) an order compelling registration 
of their stock on the corporation's books; (2) a preliminary 
injunction restraining Fairfield from paying out any of the 
corporation's assets until trial of the dissolution action; (3) 
that the default of Benedict Heights, Inc., be vacated and 
that "plaintiffs in intervention be permitted to file an answer 
on behalf of Benedict Heights, Inc., to the plaintiff's Com-
plaint"; (4) that the court determine the value of the corpo-
ration's assets and require Fairfield to post a bond pendente 
lite in the amount of such value. 
From the averments of the complaint in intervention herein-
above (and in footnote 1) quoted or summarized, and from the 
nature of the relief sought, it is clear that, although some of 
the claims asserted appear to relate to stockholders' personal 
rights, at least a substantial part of the cause stated and the 
relief sought is on behalf of the corporation and, hence, com-
petent only in a derivative action. (See Hogan v. Ingold 
(1952),38 Cal.2d 802, 809 [243 P.2d 1, 32 A.L.R.2d 834].) 
It is thus manifest that the trial court was acting within its 
power and authority, i.e., jurisdiction, when in the exercise of 
its discretion it required the posting of security under section 
834 of the Corporations Code, and prohibition is consequently 
not available to petitioners to compel the court to desist from 
enforcing its order to that effect. 
'The complaint in intervention also alleged the following, among 
otber things: 
"Fairfield is the alter ego of said Corporation •.• [T]hat said 
Corporation is a dormant shell only, without substance, and that Fairfield 
is an interloper who has, without proper, or any, authority, obtained 
possession of all of the Corporate books, records and papers, and has 
secured, and now has, full control of and dominion over all of said Cor-
poration's assets, and has collected $16,500.00 of Corporate monies ..•• 
[T ]hat .•• Fairfield has collected other sums. 
"Tbat .•• the corporate powers ... are being illegally executed 
.•. and a wrongful diversion of corporate funds bas occurred and will 
continue to occur ..•• That plaintiffs in intervention bring this .•• 
proceeding in behalf of themselves and on behalf of all other sbare-
holders .•• who desire to join in said proceedings .••• [T]hat .•• 
Fairfield, and perhaps [others] •.. are indebted to Benedict Heights, 
Inc., for their actions with respect to assets of the Corporation, and for 
dereliction of duty •••• " 
\ 
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It is of course true that section 834 "is not designed and 
does not operate to deprive a shareholder of any vested prop-
erty right. By its very words the section relates solely to ac-
tions which may be 'instituted or maintained in the right of 
any domestic or foreign corporation by the holder ... of 
shares ... of such corporation.' (Italics added.) Since the 
statute is directed only at actions instituted or maintained 'in 
the right' of the corporation it has no application to actions 
01:' suits seeking directly to enforce personal rights of share-
holders. Stockholders, if they have a personal cause of action, 
are still free to sue the corporation, the majority stockholders, 
or the directors of the corporation, and to recover for any 
cause they can establish." (Hogan v. Ingold (1952), supra, 
38 Ca1.2d 802, 809.) If petitioners' complaint in intervention 
stated a cause only for their individual and personal claims 
as stockholders, section 834 would have no application and 
the order of the court would apparently be erroneous and, we 
may assume, "beyond its jurisdiction" as that term is used in 
relation to granting prohibition. (Abelleira v. District Oourt 
of Appeal (1941), 17 Ca1.2d 280, 287 [3,4, 5, 6] et seq. [109 
P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715] ; Oity of Los Angeles v. Superior 
Oourt (1959),51 Ca1.2d423, 429-430 [2] [333 P.2d 745] ["To 
permit the issuance of prohibition it is not necessary that there 
be a lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or parties in 
the fundamental sense but only that there be a want or excess 
of the power of the court as defined by statute or by rules 
developed and followed under the doctrine of stare decisis. 
(Tidewater Assoc. Oil 00. v. Superior Oourt, 43 Ca1.2d 815, 
821 [279 P.2d 35] ; Abelleira v. District Oourt of Appeal, 17 
Ca1.2d 280, 287 et seq. [109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715])"] ; 
Lawson v. Superior Oourt (1957), 155 Cal.App.2d 755, 760 
[6] [318 P.2d 812] ["Where a court has no jurisdiction to act 
except in a particular manner, it may be restrained by pro-
hibition from acting in a different, unauthorized manner or 
may be compelled by mandate to act in a particular man-
ner"] ; see also Rescue Army v. Municipal Oourt (1946), 28 
Ca1.2d460,462-464 [la, 2a, 3] [171 P.2d 8].) But in addition 
to the matters which appear to relate to stockholders' personal 
rights, the complaint here, as already shown, alleges facts and 
seeks relief which are competent only in a derivative action. 
Moreover, in a prohibition proceeding all presumptions are 
in favor of the propriety of the lower court's action, and the 
burden is on the petitioners to establish any claimed excess 
of jurisdiction. (See Franklin v. Superior Oourt (1950), 98 
) 
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Cal.App.2d 292, 294 [2] [220 P.2d 8] ; 40 Cal.Jur.2d 158, 
§ 13; id. 262-265, § § 85, 86, and cases there cited.) Here, since 
we do not havc a complete record of thc proceedings in the 
trial court, it is our duty to presume that the order requiring 
the posting of security was intended to be and would be ap-
plied only to the derivative aspects of petitioners' complaint 
in intervention, and not to their personal rights as alleged 
stockholders. There is no showing that petitioners have ever 
been ordered to post security in an action or on a cause of 
action pleading only stockholders' personal rights. It is of 
course true that in the absence of a complete record peti-
tioners' assertions as to the legal effect of the pleadings and 
proceedings in the dissolution action can not properly be 
accepted in derogation of the lower court's jurisdiction. 
Additionally, even if we assume, contrary to the rule in 
prohibition cases, that the lower court erred in some detail of 
its order, no case for issuance of the writ is made out. It is 
elementary that prohibition will not issue where there is a 
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal. (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 1103; Bowles v. Superior Court (1955), 44 Ca1.2d 
574, 581-582 [1] [283 P.2d 704]; Brock v. Superior Court 
(1947), 29 Cal.2d 629, 637 [3] [177 P.2d 273, 170 A.L.R. 
521]; 40 Ca1.Jur.2d 134-139, and cases there cited.) The 
majority concede that petitioners have a remedy by· appeal, 
and even petitioners themselves do not suggest that such 
remedy is not adequate, but merely content themselves with 
asserting that inasmuch as no judgment of dismissal has (as of 
the time of their application) been entered "there is nothing 
from which to appeal." As declared in Melancon v. Superior 
Court (1954),42 Ca1.2d 698, 704 [2] [268 P.2d 1050] (where-
in petitioner sought both mandate and prohibition), "the 
remedy by appeal from the judgment of dismissal which pre-
sumably will follow if the ordered security is not furnished 
is not only an adequate, but is clearly a more appropriate 
remedy than the writs here sought," (italics added) where 
petitioners' complaints go only to error and not to the juris-
diction of the court. (See also C. S. Smith Metropolitan Market 
Co. v. Superior Court (1940), 16 Cal.2d 226, 228 [1] [105 
P.2d 587].) . Moreover, as the majority concede, petitioners 
are not without a remedy despite their assertion that inas-
much as no judgment of dismissal has been entered C C there 
is nothing from which to appeal." If petitioners properly re-
quest and the court refuses to enter an order or judgment 
from which they can appeal, then mandamus lies to compel 
• 
) 
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entry of judgment to put petitioners in a position to test on 
appeal the propriety (including the scope) of the order re-
quiring them to post security. (See Berri v. Superior Court 
(1955), 43 Cal.2d 856, 860-861 [11] [279 P.2d 8]; 32 Cal. 
.Tur.2d 207-214, and cases there cited.) 
I wish further to emphasize that this is the first time, inso-
far as any case called to my attention discloses, that the mere 
i<;suance of an order to show cause has been relied upon as a 
basis for ultimate issuance of the peremptory writ despite the 
admitted existence of an adequate remedy by appeal. It is 
to be remembered that in this case no alternative writ has 
been issued, as was done in City & County of San Francisco 
v. Superior Court (1959), ante, p. 236 [347 P.2d 294]; 
City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1959), 51 Ca1.2d 423, 
429 [1] [333 P.2d 745] ; Atkinson v. Superior Court (1957), 
49 Ca1.2d 338, 342 [2] [316 P.2d 960] ; and Bowles v. Superi07' 
Court (1955), supra, 44 Cal.2d 574, 582 [2, 3], yet the ma-
jority cite the above listed four cases and in each case note 
a page of the decision on which the only conceivably relevant 
proposition is a holding to the effect that when the District 
Court of Appeal or this court issues an alternative writ it ipso 
facto determines that there is no other adequate remedy. In 
the Atkinson case the majority cite page 342 (" Since no pur. 
pose but delay would be served at this time by reviewing the 
District Court's decision that the remedy by appeal was in-
adequate, we accept it for the purposes of these proceed-
ings. "). In the Bowles case the majority cite page 582 (" It 
was, of course, the duty of that court [the District Court of 
Appeal] before issuing an alternative writ to determine 
whether petitioners had another plain, speedy and adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of law."). In City & County 
of San Francisco v. Superior Court, page 243, ante, is 
cited by the majority ("The absence of another adequate 
remedy was determined by this court when we granted an 
alternative writ.") In City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court 
the majority cite pag-e 429 ("The absence of another adequate 
remedy was determined by this court when we granted an 
alternative writ.") Appended to the citation of those cas,~s 
in the majority opinion is footnote 1, reading as follows: "I n 
these cases an alternative writ rather than an order to show 
cause has issued. An order to show cause, however, like an 
alternative writ, entails an expenditure of time and effort 
of court and counsel that would be wasted if another remedy 
were subsequently found adequate and the merits of the dis-
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pute, although fully presented, were not determined." Such 
citations of authority coupled with the footnote seem to make 
it clear that in this case the majority are holding, without 
specifically so stating, that when this court issued its mere 
order to show cause it likewise determined that petitioners 
had no adequate remedy other than the writ. 
It is a fact disclosed by the records of this court that at its 
conference session on August 5, 1959, only four justices, one 
of whom is the author of this dissent, voted to issue the order 
to show cause. At that time the author of the dissent did not 
determine, and since then he has not determined, that another 
adequate remedy is lacking here. Nor did a majority of the 
court so determine. Yet the present majority dispose of the 
issue as to adequacy of remedy by declaring that" an appeal, 
however, would raise a question that has already been fully 
presented and considered at length in this proceeding, and 
no purpose but delay, to the prejudice of the parties and the 
courts, would be served by refusing to decide the jurisdic-
tional question at this time." Such a statement is scant sup-
port for proceeding to issue the writ where appeal is ad-
mittedly not only available, but is both adequate and a more 
appropriate remedy; it is, indeed, the only remedy which 
can provide a record on which this court can properly deter-
mine whether the trial court even erred in the exercise of its 
jurisdiction. The duteous purpose of preserving the integrity 
of the law would be served by adhering to the fundamental 
rule that prohibition is not available where there is an ade-
quate remedy by appeal; rendering the law uncertain by such 
departures as this only adds to the difficulties of practicing 
lawyers and the judges of other courts-and ultimately to 
the burdens of this court. 
I believe that the better view is that the purpose of the order 
to show cause issued after we granted a hearing was to give 
the parties further opportunity to brief and present their 
contentions on all issues and this court a like opportunity for 
further study of those contentions. The mere issuance of an 
order to show cause should not, in my opinion, be relied upon 
as a basis for issuing the writ in derogation of established 
procedural principles. Heretofore it has been apparently un-
questioned law that" An order to show cause is a notice of 
motion and a citation to the party to appear at a stated time 
and place to show cause why a motion should not be granted." 
(Difani v. Rivers'ide COllnty Oil Co. (1927), 201 Cal. 210, 
213-214 [1] [256 P. 210].) And as stated in McAuliffe v. 
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Coughlin (1894),105 Cal. 268, 270 138 P. 730], "The order 
to show cause was simply a notice of the motion, and a cita-
tion of the defendant to appear at a stated time and place 
and show cause why plaintiff's motion should not be granted. 
Such orders are frequently made, especially on applications 
for injunctions and writs of mandate. They are never preju-
dicial to the rights of the party cited." (Italics added.) Again, 
in Green v. Gordon (1952), 39 Cal.2d 230, 232 [1, 2] [246 
P .2d 38], this court followed the rule, stating " [1] An order 
to show cause is in the nature of a citation to a party to appear 
at a stated time and place to show why the requested relief 
should not be granted. (See Difani v. Riverside County Oil 
Co., 201 Cal. 210, 213-214 [256 P. 210].) [2] Obviously, a 
showing on general demurrer that the petition does not state 
sufficient facts to justify relief is a complete answer to an 
order to show cause, and the court is then warranted in dis-
charging the order and dismissing the proceeding." In the 
interests of certainty, for the benefit of the profession, the 
status of the above cited cases which, although not mentioned 
by the majority, are apparently overruled sub silentio insofar 
as the holdings above quoted are concerned, should be un-
equivocally defined. It is manifest that such holdings are 
inconsistent with the present majority's implied holding, here-
inabove discussed, that the mere issuance of an order to show 
cause why a writ of prohibition should not issue constitutes a 
determination that there is no other adequate remedy avail-
able. 
Certainly, as shown hereinabove, appeal is the more ap-
propriate remedy in this case if we are to consider whether, 
as suggested by petitioners, the court below erred in failing 
to grant leave to amend. This remedy appears to be plainly 
adequate and is the only remedy which can present the entire 
record for review as to possible errors at law. 
I do not believe it serves the interests of justice or wise 
court administration to permit resort to the extraordinary 
writs upon the mere plea that no judgment has as yet been 
entered and therefore "there is nothing from which to ap-
peal." 
By the terms of the complaint in intervention which was 
before the trial court at the time it ordered the security 
• posted, and a copy of which is included in the present record, 
petitioners seek relief which, as hereinabove shown, is indis-
putably in substantial part derivative in nature. We cannot 
on this petition for prohibition review for possible error a 
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record which is not before us; neither, if we adhere to estab-
lished law, can we hold that the court did not have jurisdiction 
to make the subject order. 
I would discharge the order to show cause heretofore issued 
and deny the writ sought. 
Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
The petition of the real parties in interest for a rehearing 
was denied February 24,1960. Peek, J. pro tem.,· participated 
therein in place of White, J., who deemed himself disqualified. 
Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
